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This article explores President George W. Bush’s ‘ownership society’ blueprint in comparative 
and historical perspective. By taking the ‘ownership society’ seriously, it is possible to 
understand how it is deeply rooted in the American cultural repertoire, and how it offers a 
coherent neo-liberal discourse aimed at constructing the ‘need to reform’ existing social policy 
legacies in the sense of a greater reliance on private savings and ownership. Although grounded 
in the American repertoire, President Bush’s ‘ownership society’ is inspired by a foreign model: 
Thatcher’s ‘popular capitalism,’ another neo-liberal blueprint that featured a similar celebration 
of personal ownership. Discussing Thatcherism briefly before analyzing the debate over 
President Bush’s ‘ownership society’ in the fields of housing and pensions, this article underlines 
the relationship between ideational processes and institutional legacies in policy-making.  
 
Résumé : 
Adoptant une perspective historique et comparative, ce texte explore l’idée d’«  ownership 
society » telle que formulée par le président américain George W. Bush. En prenant cette idée au 
sérieux, il est possible de comprendre en quoi elle est profondément ancrée dans le répertoire 
culturel américain, tout en offrant un discours néo-libéral cohérent qui vise à construire la 
nécessité de réformer les programmes sociaux existants dans le sens d’une dépendance accrue 
envers l’épargne et la propriété individuelles. Bien qu’enracinée dans le répertoire américain, 
l’idée d’« ownership society » du président Bush s’inspire d’un modèle étranger: le « capitalisme 
populaire » de Margaret Thatcher, qui constitue une autre célébration de la propriété individuelle. 
Analysant le thatchérisme avant de se pencher sur le débat entourant l’idée d’«  ownership 
society » du président Bush, cet article souligne la relation entre le rôle des idées et des facteurs 
institutionnels dans l’élaboration des politiques publiques.          
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  During and after the 2004 American presidential campaign, George W. Bush and his 
allies promoted a policy blueprint that promised to reshape American social policy: the 
‘ownership society.’ According to this blueprint, the federal government should further promote 
home ownership and private savings in order to increase the participation of American citizens in 
the capitalist ‘American Dream.’ Although dozens of newspaper articles have been written about 
President Bush’s ‘ownership society,’ little scholarship about this major policy proposal is 
currently available. The main objective of this article is to explore this plan in comparative and 
historical perspective. By taking the ‘ownership society’ seriously, it is possible to understand 
how it is deeply rooted in the American cultural repertoire, and how it offers a coherent neo-
liberal discourse that may construct the ‘need to reform’ existing social policy legacies in the 
sense of a greater reliance on private savings and ownership. Yet, although grounded in the 
American repertoire, President Bush’s ‘ownership society’ is inspired by a foreign model: 
Thatcher’s ‘popular capitalism,’ another neo-liberal blueprint that featured a similar celebration 
of personal ownership.  
As argued below, however, the direct link between Thatcher’s ‘popular capitalism’ and 
Bush’s ‘ownership society’ should not hide a key difference between these two blueprints: when 
President Bush unveiled his ‘ownership society’ blueprint in 2004, home ownership and private 
retirement savings were widespread in the United States, which was not the case in 1979 Britain, 
when the first Thatcher government took office. Furthermore, as opposed to Thatcher’s, Bush’s 
early 2005 push to privatize part of the public pension system (i.e. Social Security) failed. 
Drawing partly on theoretical insights from historical institutionalism, the following analysis will 
explain why. Following the growing literature on ideas and public policy, this analysis will also 
suggest that, despite the failure to privatize Social Security, the ‘ownership society’ blueprint is 
consequential, as the discourse on ownership can divert policy attention away from particular   3
social and economic problems, which, in turn, may exacerbate what Jacob Hacker (2004) labels 
‘policy drift’ (i.e. the changing impact of social programs due to the absence of reforms needed to 
adapt them to new social and economic circumstances).    
  Two parts comprise this article. The concise first half discusses the relationship between 
ideas and institutions in policy change before illustrating major theoretical claims through the 
example of social policy reform in Britain during the Thatcher years. The main focus of this 
discussion concerns the role of ideas and institutions in policy change, with a particular emphasis 
on the concept of value amplification. As argued, the celebration of ownership as a core value 
and a source of personal gain can become a powerful ideological tool mobilized in the political 
struggle over neo-liberal reform. All in all, Part One provides the comparative and theoretical 
context for Part Two, which is devoted to the analysis of President Bush’s ‘ownership society’ 
blueprint. After offering general remarks about the origin and the development of this blueprint, 
this section covers the role of value amplification in the fields of housing and Social Security 
reform. Furthermore, in order to explain why the 2005 attempt to privatize Social Security failed, 
the discussion underlines the key obstacles to reform that characterize the American institutional 
context. At the theoretical level, the most general lesson of this article is that the analysis of 
policy reform should take into account the interaction between ideas and institutions in policy-
making as well as the construction of perceived economic interests featured in most policy 
debates. 
 
Ideas, Institutions, and Policy Change: The Example of Thatcherism  
  Two streams of policy research are especially useful for the analysis of social policy 
privatization (i.e. the replacement of redistributive programs by personal ownership and savings 
accounts): the historical institutionalist literature on the impact of policy legacies and formal   4
political institutions on policy-making; the literature on the role of ideas and discourse in policy 
change. Although distinct, these two streams of literature are not incompatible, and a number of 
scholars have successfully bridged them (e.g. Béland and Hacker, 2004; Cox, 2004; Schmidt, 
2002).  
  The existing historical institutionalist literature provides much evidence that previously 
enacted policies and formal political institutions affect policy outcomes. On the one hand, the 
constituencies and vested interests that previously enacted policies create can impact future 
political struggles over them. In other words: policy creates politics (e.g. Pierson, 1994). On the 
other hand, formal political institutions affect the manner in which interests mobilize within the 
policy process. Furthermore, formal institutional settings―like the parliamentary system―create 
specific incentives and obstacles for elected officials seeking to enact new programs or, at least, 
to reform existing policy legacies (e.g. Weaver, 2000).  
The example of social policy reform during the Thatcher era illustrates these two claims 
about the role of policy legacies and formal political institutions in policy change. First, once 
elected in 1979, the Thatcher government faced vested interests stemming from post-war policy 
legacies, which included the largest public housing system in Europe (Forrest and Murie, 1988). 
This meant that, when Thatcher attempted to privatize public housing and pension programs, she 
confronted the prospect of a backlash from existing or even future beneficiaries, who formed a 
significant portion of the population. Yet, particular features of the post-war housing and pension 
legacies also created unique windows of opportunity for the Thatcher government (Pierson, 
1994). In the field of housing, for example, the presence of a massive stock of publicly-owned 
houses represented a major opportunity for the Conservatives to sell them to current tenants at a 
low price, which could reduce potential opposition to privatization from the beneficiaries 
themselves. Through the 1980 Housing Act and other measures enacted over the following years,   5
the Thatcher government successfully launched the selling of public housing to existing tenants. 
This policy became quite popular in Britain and favoured a major decline in the scope of public 
housing in Britain (e.g. Johnson and Tanner, 1998).  
In the pension domain, two institutional factors facilitated Thatcher’s attempt to privatize 
(i.e. to encourage current participants to ‘op-out’ of) SERPS. First, SERPS had only been in place 
since the mid-1970s, and it had no current beneficiaries when the Conservatives launched their 
legislative pension proposals a decade later. Second, the original SERPS offered the possibility to 
those covered by occupational pension schemes to ‘op-out’ of the public program. This reality 
weakened the political support for SERPS by covering only part of the workforce and by opening 
the door to more lax opting-out conditions (Pierson and Weaver, 1992). It is interesting to note 
that these two factors contrast with the situation of the United States, where Social Security 
constitutes a quasi universal public pension program that was created as early as 1935 (Pierson, 
1994). In addition to existing policy legacies, formal political institutions contributed to 
Thatcher’s relative success in reshaping housing and pension programs. Although the British 
parliamentary system creates a greater level of imputability that makes blame avoidance 
strategies (Weaver, 1986) more difficult to pursue, the great level of power centralization that 
characterizes the British polity helped Thatcher implement her neo-liberal reforms. Yet, despite 
this favourable institutional environment, the 1985 attempt to abolish SERPS failed amidst much 
political opposition for labour unions and the Labour Party, which forced the second Thatcher 
government to formulate a more moderate proposal that was finally enacted in 1986. Although 
this reform favoured a gradual privatization of the program through the multiplication of 
potentially attractive opting-out choices, Thatcher’s failure to abolish SERPS is a reminder that 
neo-liberal reform is a risky business that can face great institutional and political obstacles.      6
But it would be misleading to reduce the politics of housing and pension reform during 
the Thatcher years to the enduring weight of institutional legacies. As the literature on policy 
ideas and discourse suggests, political actors seeking to alter existing policy legacies must 
formulate coherent and attractive reform blueprints (Blyth, 2002) before ‘constructing the need to 
reform’ (Cox, 2001) such legacies through a particular discourse about economic imperatives and 
moral values that can make citizens and interest groups believe that reform is unavoidable and, in 
some contexts, that it is in their interest to support a specific policy alternative (e.g. Campbell, 
1998; Schmidt, 2002). Following the social movement literature on framing processes, one can 
argue that value amplification is a major aspect of the discourse on policy change. According to 
Snow and his colleagues, ‘Value amplification refers to the identification, idealization, and 
elevation of one or more values presumed basic to prospective constituents but which have not 
inspired collective action for any number of reasons.’ (Snow et al. 1986: 469) Following this 
logic, by constantly referring to—and celebrating—old values present in a society’s cultural 
repertoire, political actors attempt to construct a cultural and moral imperative for reform that 
supports their own policy agenda.
1 This is exactly what happed under Thatcherism, when 
Conservatives mobilized an individualistic discourse about the economic and moral virtues of 
personal ownership in order to construct the need for social policy privatization so central to 
Thatcher’s ‘popular capitalism’ blueprint. This speech from 1984 is an example among many 
others of the economic and moral discourse on ownership at the heart of Thatcher’s push for 
social policy privatization (in this case, housing):  
Spreading the ownership of property more widely is central to this Government’s 
philosophy. (…) A house is most people’s biggest asset. It is a large investment, 
and it needs protection. (…) But a house is more than this. It is a symbol of 
security, and a stake in the future. People who own houses do so not just for   7
themselves, but for their children. They do so as members of a responsible 
society—proud of the heritage derived from the past, glad to care for it, and eager 
to give the next generation a bit of capital to give them a start. I believe in home 
ownership because I believe in individual responsibility, and I believe that by our 
actions we can shape the future (Thatcher 1984). 
This is a classic example of value amplification, where private ownership is described as a sacred 
value, a source of economic prosperity, and the most legitimate form of security available to 
workers and their families within capitalist societies. This discourse about the virtues of 
ownership is consistent with the possessive individualism integral to the old liberal tradition and 
the British cultural repertoire (MacPherson, 1962). There is evidence that this type of consistent 
neo-liberal discourse proved essential in providing a reasoned rationale for reform in Britain (e.g. 
Schmidt, 2002). As the remaining of this article suggests, in countries like Britain and the United 
States, the lasting presence of old liberal values like ownership and self-reliance in a society’s 
cultural repertoire provide powerful symbols that may legitimize the need for social policy 
reform. Moreover, it is crucial to note that, as suggested above, value amplification is not 
necessarily distinct from the construction of perceived economic interests that may participate in 
the formulation of reform imperatives (e.g. Steensland, forthcoming). This means that the 
discourse about values and moral imperatives can merge with the one on the economic rationale 
for reform, both from a collective and from a personal standpoint (i.e. economic prosperity at 
large and personal gain). The following analysis provides more ground to this claim.    
Yet, effective framing efforts like value amplification are only one of the conditions for 
policy change, and it is hard to deny that institutional factors weigh heavily on policy-making. 
For example, vested interests related to existing social policies may undermine reform efforts 
amidst a coherent framing campaign. The remarks below about Reaganism and President Bush’s   8
‘ownership society’ further support this argument. In the fragmented context of ‘divided 
government,’ even coherent and culturally resonant neo-liberal blueprints and framing strategies 
may not lead to institutional change. This is especially true when powerful constituencies related 
to existing policy legacies increase electoral risks stemming from privatization or retrenchment 
proposals. Despite these remarks that allude to the enduring institutional obstacles to Social 
Security privatization in the United States, the following analysis suggests that discourse and 
value amplification may impact the policy process even when the prospects for bold legislative 
action remain elusive. For example, the emergence of a coherent policy blueprint and discourse 
can divert political attention away from some social and economic problems, or make alternative 
types of reform (for example, welfare state expansion) impossible to pursue. This situation can 
exacerbate ‘policy drift’ by discarding progressive reform alternatives that could otherwise adapt 
existing social policies to changing economic and social conditions (Hacker, 2004). All in all, the 
following analysis will suggest that simultaneously paying attention to institutional and ideational 
processes can improve our understanding of the current politics of neo-liberal policy change, in 
the United States and elsewhere.   
 
 The Politics of Ownership in the United States 
  Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher are both considered powerful symbols of neo-
liberalism,
2 and it is common to compare their legacies. In the field of social policy, it is clear 
that the successive Thatcher governments accomplished more than the Reagan administration. As 
mentioned above, this is related to the fact that Reagan operated in the context of a ‘divided 
government,’ where political power is far more fragmented than in Britain. Furthermore, social 
programs like Social Security had created stronger constituencies than SERPS―for example, the 
American Association for Retired Persons (AARP)―further complicating the task of American   9
conservatives (Pierson 1994). Despite the lack of scholarly consensus on that issue, it is probably 
in the fields of taxation and military policy that the legacy of Reaganism proved the most 
enduring (e.g. Brownlee and Graham 2003). Yet, because of their apparent failure to enact path 
departing social policy reforms, the Reagan administration did not activate a full reconstruction 
of the American polity similar to the one achieved five decades earlier by Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt and his New Deal (Schwab 1991; Skowronek 1993; Stockman 1986). During the 
1990s, conservatives pushed for radical social policy reforms that could complete the unfinished 
political reconstruction of the Reagan era (e.g. Derthick 2001; Quadagno 1999). Ironically, it was 
in 1996, when president Clinton signed the most conservative social policy reform enacted in 
contemporary American society: the Temporary Aid for Needy Families, a program that imposed 
strict time limits and other workfare-style restrictions on most social assistance beneficiaries 
(Somers and Block 2005; Weaver 2000). Still, as evidenced below, attempts to partially 
transform Social Security into a savings scheme failed during President Clinton’s second 
mandate. Consequently, when they took office in early 2001, George W. Bush and his team could 
still aspire to a powerful conservative legacy through the neo-liberal restructuring of Social 
Security (Béland, 2005). To a certain extent, such a transformation would complete the 
unfinished institutional reconstruction that Reagan had launched exactly two decades earlier. 
During his first mandate, however, President Bush’s agenda, like Reagan’s, focused mainly on 
tax cuts and national security issues, especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  
Beginning in late 2003, however, President Bush increasingly used the expression 
‘ownership society’ to refer to his new domestic agenda (Kosterlitz 2004: 230) The idea of 
‘ownership society’ became widely present in his discourse during and after the 2004 presidential 
campaign (Serafini 2005). His model for an ‘ownership society’ is nothing else than Thatcher’s 
own economic and social policy reforms.
3 More important, as showed below, the core policy   10
objectives and the ideological framing processes surrounding Bush’s pro-ownership platform is 
similar to Thatcher’s. Drawing on the American cultural repertoire, President Bush and his allies 
constructed private ownership as the core principle of American society, a principle that must 
triumph against the New Deal’s ‘big government’ legacy.  
Before exploring the framing processes and the policy alternatives tied to the ‘ownership 
society’ blueprint, one must note that the present American economic and social context is very 
different from the one in which Thatcher’s first conservative government operated. As opposed to 
the situation prevailing in Britain around 1980, the United States was already considered an 
‘ownership society,’ where the majority of the population owns a house and/or stocks. In a 2005 
survey, for example, ‘72% [of the respondents] said they own their house and 60% have money 
invested in the stock market’ (USA Today 2005). Moreover, the belief that personal ownership is 
something great for citizens and workers is reflected in a 2003 survey showing that more than 
half of American citizens dream about owning their own business, while 10% already do 
(Breeden 2003).  
On the whole, the ‘ownership society’ is a blueprint that subsumes and articulates well-
known social and economic principles that have long been at the health of the neo-liberal vision. 
As early as 1964, Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater used some of these 
principles against the legacies of the New Deal and the Fair Deal (Nash 1996). Four decades 
later, Bush’s ‘ownership society’ is more than an empty slogan, as it constitutes both a coherent 
blueprint and a powerful neo-liberal discourse legitimizing significant—yet generally 
incremental—social policy change in American society. Conservatives believe that the 
implementation of the ‘ownership society’ blueprint could reinforce their electoral coalition and 
maintain the Republican political domination in the years to come. Grover Norquist, president of 
the right-wing Americans for Tax Reform, summarizes these conservative hopes for ownership-  11
centred coalition building: ‘You can’t have a hate-and-envy class if 80 percent of the public owns 
stock. That makes it impossible for Democrats to govern. It spells the end of their world’ (cited in 
Kosterlitz 2004: 231). In part for these reasons, the intense framing processes surrounding the 
‘ownership society’ blueprint should be taken seriously.  
 
Housing  
Compared to the situation prevailing in Britain, public housing in the United States has 
long constituted a rather modest policy area. Authorized in the 1937 National Housing Act, 
public housing has faced much opposition from conservative leaders fearing ‘possible 
competition with the private housing market and the prospect of relocating poor people, 
especially blacks, to more affluent neighbourhoods’ (Pierson 1994: 76). Targeting only the 
poorest citizens, public housing became increasingly associated with deprived, minority-
dominated inner city neighbourhoods (Popkin et al. 2000; Vale 2000). Although public housing 
significantly expanded in the late 1960s and 1970s, little more than one percent of the American 
population lived in housing projects by 1980. Additionally, less than three percent of the 
population received allowances for privately rented housing (Pierson 1994: 76). Overall, 
American public housing programs proved both limited in scope and politically vulnerable.  
Yet in the United States, there is another aspect of housing policy that is a crucial to what 
Christopher Howard labels ‘the hidden welfare state:’ home mortgage interest deduction (Howard 
1997).
4 Enacted in 1913 as part of the federal bill creating the individual income taxes, this low-
profile fiscal measure has gained more political support over time. The bold expansion of these 
taxes during the Second World War increased the impact of the home mortgage interest 
deduction, which affected a far larger percentage of the population, especially members of the 
middle class, many of whom had to pay federal income tax for the first time ever. After the war,   12
this policy became a major component of the federal push for private middle class residential 
construction. To a certain extent, home mortgage interest deduction thus became a hidden, 
indirect subsidy to the American construction industry (Glaeser and Shapiro 2002: 2). Generally, 
well-off citizens disproportionately benefit from that deduction which, in 1995, represented an 
annual revenue loss of more than 50 billion dollars a year (Howard 1997). Furthermore, other 
fiscal incentives meant to promote home ownership like deferral of capital gains on sale of 
principal residences cost billions of dollars annually to the federal treasury. Because home 
ownership is rightly viewed as a potential source of economic security (e.g. Winter 1999), these 
policies are often perceived as social ones, in spite of their commonly regressive nature.  
  During the Reagan era, Congress enacted significant cuts in federal public housing 
programs. Considering that organizations defending low-income housing interests were 
politically weak, public housing became an easy target for conservative budget cuts. Yet, because 
of the comparatively small size of the American public housing system, conservative attacks 
against it seemed less significant institutionally and politically than Thatcher’s ‘right to buy’ 
campaign (Pierson 1994). In addition to cuts in existing public housing programs, the 1980s 
witnessed something far less consistent with the Reagan administration’s conservative agenda: 
the reduction in tax provisions that have promoted home ownership since 1913. Although the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 maintained the home mortgage interest deduction, for example, lower tax 
rates and higher standard deductions reduced the overall fiscal value of that measure by about 20 
percent (Howard 1997: 109). In the 1990s, attacks against this measure multiplied in a context of 
fiscal austerity. During the 1992 campaign, for example, presidential candidate Ross Perot listed 
cuts in the home mortgage interest deduction as one of the possible ways to reduce the federal 
deficit. ‘Why should we subsidize interest on huge, expensive homes? The average mortgage in 
the United States is $104,000. I propose that we limit deductions on interest to mortgages of   13
$250,000 and that we eliminate this special deduction for vacation homes’ (Perot 1992: 42-43). 
But such proposals were never enacted, and the home mortgage interest deduction experienced a 
real (inflation-adjusted) growth of more than five percent between 1980 and 1995, in spite of the 
negative effect of the 1986 Tax Reform Act (Howard 1997: 112-113). By and large, most fiscal 
measures meant to encourage home ownership in American society survived the era of budget 
cuts of the 1980s and 1990s.
5  
Despite the advent of new fiscal deficits in the early 2000s, President Bush transformed 
tax-sponsored home ownership as a major aspect of his domestic agenda. Even though about 70 
percent of American citizens are homeowners, the president is mainly targeting racial and ethnic 
minorities, who have an average rate of ownership barely above 50 percent. The president’s 
official goal is to ‘increase the number of minority homeowners by 5.5 million families by the 
end of the decade.’ (White House 2005) As home ownership is a popular feature of the so-called 
‘American dream,’ promoting ownership through modest, low-cost programs is perhaps a good 
political strategy to seduce minority voters who have long shown more support for the 
Democratic Party. ‘For millions of individuals and families, the American Dream starts with 
owning a home. When families move into a home of their own, they gain independence and 
confidence, and their faith in the future grows. The spread of ownership and opportunity helps 
give our citizens a vital stake in the future of America and the chance to realize the great promise 
of our country’ (Bush 2005c). This discourse is a clear example of value amplification where the 
president elevates the meaning and stresses the virtues of personal ownership in order to 
legitimize aspects of his domestic agenda. As in Thatcher’s individualistic discourse on social 
policy, ownership is constructed as a sacred value and a source of autonomy that is synonymous 
with personal success, financial gain, and genuine economic security.   14
The modest nature of the measures put forward to promote home ownership contrasts 
strongly with the president’s optimistic and ambitious rhetoric. An example of the modest 
measures aimed at encouraging minorities to become homeowners is the $200 million-per-year 
American Dream Downpayment Act. This measure is meant to help about 40,000 families each 
year pay their down mortgage. Furthermore, the president proposed the Zero-Downpayment 
Initiative, a measure that would ‘allow the Federal Housing Administration to insure mortgages 
for first-time homebuyers without a down payment’ (ibid.). Finally, the president proposed 
measures to support rural home ownership.  
Generally, the president frames home ownership as the best source of economic security 
for workers and their families. Interestingly, in a 2004 speech on housing policy, he referred to 
growing job insecurity in the United States to legitimize his ‘ownership society’ and, more 
precisely, his proposals to help first-time homebuyers. 
Today, people are changing jobs and careers quite often, and the workforce has 
changed. (…) And in times of change, I understand that ownership brings stability 
to our neighbourhoods and security to our families. In changing times, it helps if 
you own something. It helps bring security to you. By paying a mortgage instead 
of rent, by putting money into your own retirement plan, you're storing up wealth 
for your family (Bush 2004).  
To a certain extent, this illustrates a central aspect of neo-liberalism: accepting job insecurity and 
the lack of comprehensive social protection as a fate while embracing possessive individualism 
and personal ownership as the most, if not the only, reliable source of economic security. Instead 
of trusting the state to provide protection, citizens should stick to traditional ‘American values’ 
like economic individualism and self-reliance in part because it is in their perceived interest to do 
that.    15
  What is striking about President Bush’s campaign to expand home ownership is the 
ideological and political logic that drives it. As opposed to the situation prevailing in Britain in 
the late 1970s, the United States has a comparatively high home ownership rate (Bartlett 2001) 
and yet, the president pushes for new measures to favour access to that ever-popular institution. 
In the meantime, public housing is facing tremendous challenges (e.g. Popkin et al. 2000) and 
relatively little is done inside the beltway to correct that situation, confirming the common 
wisdom that, in the United States at least, ‘programs for the poor are poor programs’ (e.g. 
Skocpol 1990). The small size of the measures President Bush supports to increase home 
ownership among low-income families provides more ground to that common wisdom. 
Embedded in the ‘ownership society’ blueprint and the individualistic discourse surrounding it, 
the push for an increase in home ownership rates is part of a coalition-building strategy that 
conservatives hope could convince more members of ethnic and racial minorities to support the 
Republican Party. Meanwhile, federal inaction regarding public housing is an enduring source of 
policy drift that contributes to a deterioration of the low-income housing. The White House’s 
almost exclusive focus on home ownership is unlikely to improve that situation. Implicitly, the 
dominant neo-liberal framing processes regarding possessive individualism and private property 
help shift the policy agenda away from the existing public housing problems, which worsen over 
time in the absence of major state investments. This suggests that a coherent neo-liberal discourse 
can indirectly facilitate policy drift. In the case of housing policy, the widely held belief that 
social policies have ‘perverse effects’ that create social problems (Somers and Block 2005) 
reinforces the neo-liberal case for private ownership, legislative inaction, and, indirectly, policy 
drift.  
  Concerning the American housing debate, ideational analysis suggests that maintaining 
home ownership at the centre of the agenda diverts policy attention away from the existing public   16
housing crisis, that value amplification is a major aspect of that process through an optimistic 
discourse about the moral superiority of home ownership and, that this housing model is a source 
of economic gain for those who buy a home. All in all, this analysis enriches the historical 
institutionalist account about the weight of institutional legacies and the central role of policy 
drift in contemporary American social policy. If the absence of major legislative action 
(combined with changing social and economic conditions) can lead to policy drift, paying close 
attention to ideational processes like value amplification and blueprint formation helps to 
understand how policy attention can be diverted away from major social and economic problems 
in the name of a powerful ideological vision that can considerably narrow the scope of the policy 
agenda. By symbolically excluding any possible expansion of public housing, the ownership 
blueprint and discourse is not inconsequential in spite of the lack of major housing privatization.  
 
Social Security 
As in Britain, the American public pension system is relatively modest in scope. It is 
divided into two main parts: federal old age, survivors, and disability insurance (OASDI)—an 
earnings-related pension scheme; and, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), an income-tested 
federal assistance program covering poor elderly citizens not entitled to OASDI benefits. 
Additionally, tax-subsidized private pension schemes cover less than 40% of the working 
population. These private schemes take various forms, from defined-benefit plans to individual 
savings accounts (Sass 1997).  
Enacted in 1935, OASDI is commonly referred to as Social Security. As opposed to 
SERPS, which was enacted only in 1975, Social Security was a mature pay-as-you-go program 
when Reagan came to power. Early on, the Reagan administration made several strategic 
mistakes when dealing with the emergence of a fiscal imbalance in that popular program   17
(Stockman 1986).
6 To avoid being blamed for attacking ‘the third rail of American politics,’ 
Reagan launched a bipartisan commission that finally issued a report in early 1983 (National 
Commission on Social Security Reform 1983). Later in 1983, Congress enacted technical 
changes, for example, new payroll tax increases, to solve the short-term fiscal crisis in Social 
Security. Additionally, the 1983 legislation made provisions for a rise in the retirement age from 
65 to 67 that would gradually take effect between the years 2000 and 2022 (Light 1995). Overall, 
the Reagan administration and Republican members of Congress proved unable to pursue a 
radical reform agenda similar to Thatcher’s. 
Since 1983, no significant Social Security reform has been enacted in the United States. 
Despite the conservative push to partially privatized Social Security in a Thatcherite vein, the 
federal program remains a pay-as-you-go system. From an historical institutionalist perspective, 
the explanation for this legislative stasis can be found in large part in the powerful constituencies 
that have emerged as a feedback effect of the program’s development as a mature pay-as-you-go 
system, which, as opposed to Britain’s original SERPS, has no opting out for private sector 
workers covered by an occupational pension. This means that Social Security generates stronger 
constituencies than SERPS, reinforcing its political sustainability. The imposing membership of 
the American Association for Retired Persons (AARP) is the symbol of the powerful 
institutionalized opposition to Social Security restructuring (e.g. Pierson, 1994). Yet, as Hacker 
recently argued, the development of tax-sponsored private savings accounts and the absence of 
progressive Social Security reform lead to ‘policy drift,’ as the level of protection offered to 
many American workers is eroding (Hacker 2004). Furthermore, conservatives have launched a 
massive ideological attack against Social Security that culminated during the first months of 
President Bush’s second mandate.    18
The conservative attempt to undermine the foundations of Social Security began more 
than two decades ago. Although economic growth and the content of the 1983 reform improved 
the fiscal situation of Social Security during the rest of the 1980s and most of the 1990s, 
conservatives organized to erode support for that program (Teles 1998). Adopting a ‘Leninist 
strategy,’ conservative experts and politicians supported the enactment of new fiscal incentives 
that would promote the expansion of private savings and financial investment (Butler and 
Germanis 1984). Since the 1980s, the United States has witnessed the swift growth of 401(k)s 
and other tax-sponsored savings schemes in a context where many employers moved away from 
traditional defined benefit plans in order to shift economic risks from the firm to workers (Hacker 
2002).
7 In the long run, this incremental logic could further diffuse the ‘financial culture’ among 
the middle class while reducing the support for Social Security among wealthier citizens. An 
optimistic discourse about the rewards of personal investment legitimizes such forms of 
institutional change through rhetoric about the virtues of ‘popular finance’ (Teles 1998). Ever-
present in the mass media and political discourse, ‘popular finance’ is an optimistic, neo-liberal 
frame rooted in possessive individualism and the cult of private ownership. From this 
perspective, the development of private savings schemes is not only related to the economic 
interests of the financial sector and the strategies of political actors who attempt to reduce middle 
class support for Social Security; it is rooted in a coherent neo-liberal discourse that constitutes 
the foundation to what would become known as the ‘ownership society’ blueprint.  Like in 
Britain, the promotion of such a neo-liberal blueprint involves value amplification, as American 
conservatives frame personal ownership as a supremely positive value that brings emancipation, 
freedom, and economic prosperity to ordinary people, especially the middle class (e.g. Ferrara 
and Tanner, 1998).    19
Ironically, it was under the democratic presidency of William Clinton that the push for 
‘Social Security privatization’ finally gained ground. As in other countries that possess mature 
public pension programs like Social Security, full privatization—diverting all pension 
contributions to personal savings accounts—constitutes a highly problematic option for policy-
makers because current workers would have to finance the pensions of existing Social Security 
beneficiaries and, at the same time, save for their own retirement. Because of this ‘double 
payment problem,’ partial privatization—diverting only a fraction of the pension contributions to 
personal savings accounts—was increasingly been perceived as a more realistic policy option in 
the 1990s (Derthick 2001; Weaver 2005). Exceptional stock market performances and the 
multiplication of tax-sponsored private savings schemes created greater financial optimism, 
which in turn provided conservatives with new ideological ammunition to construct the ‘need to 
reform’ Social Security (Teles 1998). In the neo-liberal discourse about Social Security 
privatization, the idea that this program is a ‘bad investment’ for workers is crucial. From this 
perspective, the carving of personal savings accounts out of the existing program would make 
workers wealthier through significantly higher returns (e.g. Ferrara and Tanner 1998). This 
discourse is related to the above-mentioned idea that personal ownership is a better source of 
economic gain and prosperity than Social Security. This means that the value amplification 
discourse about ownership also constitutes an attempt to shape citizens’ perceptions of economic 
self-interests.
8  
In the late 1990s, Clinton increasingly opposed privatization, and on the Republican side, 
the acute perception of electoral risks stemming from that policy alternative prevented reform 
(Weaver 2005). Yet, the intense debate over Social Security privatization that took place at that 
moment paved the way to George W. Bush’s campaign to partially transform Social Security into 
a savings scheme coherent with possessive individualism, personal ownership, and, more   20
generally, neo-liberalism. As early as the spring of 2000, as the presumed Republican nominee, 
George W. Bush endorsed the partial privatization of Social Security ‘saying that he favoured 
permitting individuals to invest a portion of their Social Security payroll tax’ (Derthick 2001: 
208). Once in power, the new Republican president appointed a commission on Social Security 
reform (Strengthening Social Security and Creating Wealth for all Americans) composed of 
individuals who all supported several key principles consistent with the president’s neo-liberal 
vision (Weaver 2005). The day he launched that commission, the president made it clear that 
Social Security reform should reinforce personal ownership and possessive individualism: 
‘Personal savings accounts will transform Social Security from a government IOU into personal 
property and real assets; property that workers will own in their own names and that they can 
pass along to their children. Ownership, independence, access to wealth should not be the 
privilege of a few. They’re the hope of every American, and we must make them the foundation 
of Social Security’ (Bush 2001). This populist and neo-liberal rhetoric is analogous to Thatcher’s 
‘popular capitalism’ blueprint. In framing ownership, independence, and access to wealth as 
closely related principles from which all citizens should benefit, the president attempted to 
construct Social Security privatization as a source of economic emancipation for workers and 
citizens, especially targeting the middle class. This form of value amplification depicts ownership 
as one of the most positive principles of American society. This elevated principle, related to core 
‘American values’ like independence and self-reliance, legitimizes the neo-liberal policy 
alternatives stemming from it. Social Security privatization is among these principles. Because 
politicians who support privatization face accusations of working for the ‘special interests’ of 
Wall Street, linking this policy alternative to the embellished idea of personal ownership 
constitutes an attempt to convince middle class citizens that they (and not only the financial 
sector) have an interest in supporting privatization. 
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Unfortunately for privatizers, the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the following 
downfall in stock-market performances reduced the visibility of and the short-term support for 
Social Security reform (Weaver 2005). When the presidential commission published its report in 
December 2001, Social Security reform had become a marginal issue on the federal policy 
agenda. It was only the gradual return to financial and economic prosperity in 2004 and the 
efforts of the Bush administration that helped move this issue back onto the federal agenda. At 
that moment, this issue became an explicit and central element of President Bush’s new 
‘ownership society’ blueprint (e.g. The Economist, 2004). 
During the 2004 presidential race and the first half year of his second presidential 
mandate, George W. Bush aggressively supported partial Social Security privatization as a 
central aspect of this blueprint. Like Thatcher’s, his rhetoric about ownership is grounded in the 
idea that private property and personal savings represent the best and the most legitimate source 
of security for the individual. For conservatives, Social Security privatization has long been part 
of a broader neo-liberal agenda that aims at fighting economic redistribution while increasing the 
reliance of citizens and workers on individualistic, market-based forms of protection (Quadagno 
1999). ‘I think government ought to promote an ownership society. We ought to encourage more 
people to own their own home, encourage entrepreneurs to be able to take risk and own their own 
business -- and in this case, encourage Americans from all walks of life, if they so choose, to 
manage their own retirement account’ (Bush 2005a). As mentioned above, this discourse is 
similar to Thatcher’s neo-liberal rhetoric about personal ownership and the virtues of possessive 
individualism used to justify both housing and pension privatization in the 1980s.  More 
specifically, this discourse frames ownership as a source of personal autonomy while stressing 
the idea that citizens should take control over their own economic destiny instead of depending 
on unreliable state-managed programs like Social Security. Instead of directly attacking the   22
redistributive nature of Social Security, the president draws on cultural representations about the 
virtues of ‘choice’ and self-reliance without acknowledging that the triumph of personal 
ownership could actually undermine the economic security of specific segments of the 
population. Another aspect of Bush’s ideological campaign is an appeal to personal gain present 
in Thatcher’s rhetoric and in the American conservative discourse that has promoted Social 
Security privatization since the 1990s. ‘One, the government does a lousy job on getting a good 
rate of return on your money. As a matter of fact, people calculate that in the Social Security 
system you earn about 1.8 percent on your money. That’s not a very good deal. You see, if you 
have a personal savings account, you could do a lot better than 1.8 percent. A conservative mix of 
bonds and stocks, you can get up to 7 percent or 8 percent’ (Bush 2005b). This discourse 
reinforces the neo-liberal wisdom that ‘big government’ is inefficient, and that individuals could 
do better on their own. For President Bush and his conservative allies, the state is mainly there to 
promote possessive individualism and personal responsibility, and the partial transformation of 
Social Security into a system of individual savings accounts would correspond to that neo-liberal 
mission. This anti-statist rhetoric emanating from the top national elected official is similar to 
Thatcherism’s campaign against the ‘nanny state.’  
Yet, even with the dominance of the neo-liberal discourse on ownership, as well as the 
massive development of tax-sponsored savings schemes in the private sector, President Bush 
faced strong opposition to his proposal to allow individuals to divert some of their payroll tax 
contributions into personal savings accounts. Feminist groups, labour unions, the AARP, and the 
Democratic Party still oppose Social Security privatization. For many of these actors, the true 
issue at stake is not the restoration of ‘American values’ through Social Security privatization but 
the declining confidence in a program that actually works. Against the individualistic rhetoric 
concerning ‘American values’ and the virtues of personal ownership, they tend to frame Social   23
Security as a great national success story, while framing the need to reshape it is a pure 
ideological construction, a ‘phony crisis.’ (Baker and Weisbrot 1999) Counter to the idea that 
privatization would benefit everyone, supporters of Social Security argue that privatization would 
hurt most women, African-Americans, and low-income citizens. Perhaps more importantly, 
despite genuine fears about the future of the program in the context of demographic aging, the 
public remained divided over the issue of Social Security privatization (e.g. Cook, Barabas, and 
Page 2002). Even if they have a significant majority in Congress, Republicans fall short of the 
60-vote threshold that would allow them to dominate the Senate and avoid a Democratic 
filibuster.  
For these reasons, political risks stemming from Social Security privatization have not 
declined and Democrats are still willing to use the fight to preserve Social Security as a powerful 
electoral weapon against Republicans (Weaver 2005). Democrats, although critical of the 
potentially regressive nature of the president’s ‘ownership society’ blueprint, seldom question 
possessive individualism and the cult of personal ownership at the centre of his framing 
strategies. Paradoxically, scandals like Enron have undermined the confidence in big business 
and financial capitalism.
10 This is perhaps why the president and his conservative allies focus so 
much on small businesses and personal ownership in an economic system that is still dominated 
by large firms (e.g. Meeks, DeCastro, and Meyer 2002). As shown above, such populist focus on 
personal ownership and possessive individualism is what unites Thatcher’s ‘popular capitalism’ 
and President Bush’s ‘ownership society’ blueprints.  
  Yet, there is a major difference between Thatcher and Bush: while the former succeeded 
in reforming SERPS, the latter’s campaign to privatize Social Security went nowhere. By June 
2005, the president even decided to suspend his campaign, as the opposition to his proposals 
remained widespread. Two above-mentioned institutional factors help explain policy outcome   24
differences between Britain and the United States. First, Social Security is a ‘mature’ pay-as-you-
go program that distributes pensions to the vast majority of American elderly. This situation 
contrasts with the one prevailing in Britain in the early-mid 1980s, when SERPS had yet to create 
an army of beneficiaries. The fact that Social Security has created large constituencies remains a 
formidable obstacle to privatization, as Democrats are more than willing to exploit the electoral 
risk stemming from the existence of a large army of current and future beneficiaries concerned 
about the program’s future. Second, considering the high level of power fragmentation within the 
American policy, reforming Social Security would require a large political consensus that 
remains more than elusive. From this perspective, the successive Thatcher governments had an 
institutional advantage over the Bush administration, as power concentration that characterizes 
the British parliamentary system facilitated reform (Pierson, 1994).  
Yet, in the United States, the absence of formal legislative reform does not mean that the 
discourse surrounding Social Security privatization is inconsequential. By shifting the attention 
away from other possible types of Social Security reform, conservatives may have prevented the 
enactment of new measures and benefit increases that could have improved existing social 
protection to help citizens facing new risks related to changing socio-economic conditions. 
Undoubtedly, the focus on privatization at the centre of the ‘ownership society’ blueprint 
marginalized other policy issues like the future of Social Security’s family benefits in the context 
of changing gender and family relations (Favreault, Sammartino, and Steuerle 2001). This means 
that neo-liberal agenda control favoured policy drift as Social Security benefits gradually lost 
some of their real value over time. These remarks suggest once again that ideas and frames can 
contribute to policy drift and other forms of institutional change in subtle yet important ways.  
  Beyond this genuine form of ‘policy diversion,’ one can draw at least two other lessons 
from the analysis of the American debate over Social Security privatization. First, this analysis   25
shows how conservative politicians and their allies pushed Social Security privatization on the 
federal policy agenda in the absence of a short term fiscal crisis, which in turn, diverted the 
attention away from other problems such as the growing inadequacy of Social Security benefits 
for the poorest segments of the population. Second, this analysis underlines how constant 
references to the idea of ownership helped construct the ‘need to reform’ Social Security 
privatization (Teles 1998). From this angle, Social Security privatization is largely about sending 




  This paper underlines the role of ideas and institutions in the contemporary American 
housing and Social Security debates. More specifically, it explores the historical and political 
meaning of President Bush’s ‘ownership society’ blueprint, by comparing it with Thatcher’s own 
crusade in favour of social policy privatization. At the institutional level, this study confirms the 
historical institutionalist assumption that policy legacies and formal political institutions can 
significantly affect policy outcomes. Yet, this article also suggests that paying close attention to 
ideational processes such as blueprint formation and value amplification can improve our 
understanding of the politics of policy reform. First, in order to make a case for reform, political 
actors must put forward coherent blueprints that can reshape the policy agenda in favour of their 
desired proposals. Second, through the process of value amplification, political actors can help 
construct the ‘need to reform’ existing policy legacies by appealing to shared values and moral 
imperatives, which are often related to economic arguments about growth and prosperity. In the 
case of the ownership discourse, the relationship between value amplification and the shaping of 
interest perception is clear, as ownership is described as both a source of moral responsibility and   26
of economic growth and personal gain. And, if institutional obstacles can prevent the enactment 
of coherent blueprints, ideas and discourse may still impact policy-making by shifting the 
attention away from specific social and economic problems, and by imposing a set of policy 
options as the only ones worth attention. To a certain extent, this is what happened in the United 
States under the Bush presidency, as the failure to enact major housing and Social Security 
reform contributed to a genuine form of legislative stagnation that reinforces policy drift. As for 
the comparison between Britain and the United States, institutional differences should not hide a 
major form of ideological convergence: in both countries, neo-liberal actors can draw on a 
cultural repertoire strongly rooted in the liberal tradition, which is not the case of for their 
counterparts from Continental Europe. For example, French policy-makers found it hard to 
formulate a coherent neo-liberal discourse and blueprint for the very simple reason that old 
liberal ideas and values fare poorly in their country. Instead, they must paradoxically rely on the 
idea of solidarity at the core of the French Republican tradition (e.g. Lamont, 2000). So, although 
President Bush and his allies find it difficult to implement his ‘ownership society’ blueprint, they 
have access to powerful cultural and ideological resources that allow them to construct an 
explicitly neo-liberal and culturally resonant platform that can have a significant and lasting 
impact on the policy agenda. In the future, more research about the relationship between 
ideational processes and institutional legacies could enrich our understanding of the conditions of 
successful agenda control and legislative reform in advanced industrial societies.        
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Endnotes  
                                                 
1 The concept of repertoire refers to a relatively coherent set of cultural symbols and political 
representations mobilized during social and political debates to frame the issues and shape the 
public’s perceptions (Marx Ferree 2003). 
2 Based on the idea that markets are more efficient than states at distributing resources and 
regulating the economy, neo-liberalism promotes privatization and the application of market 
solutions to public policy issues. In the field of social policy, neo-liberalism is fighting large-
scale redistribution in the name of personal responsibility. 
3 The President’s chief advisor, Karl Rove, explicitly referred to a book about Thatcherism during 
recent private White House meetings related to the ‘ownership society’ blueprint (Charter 2005). 
4 The two following paragraphs draw extensively on Howard’s book (1997).  
5 According to some experts, a measure like home mortgage interest deduction may not have a 
strong impact on the rates of home ownership (Bartlett 2001: 3).  
6 In 1977, Congress had already passed legislation modifying the indexation system and 
increasing tax rates to prevent fiscal imbalance in Social Security (Snee and Ross 1978). 
7 In 2003, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) ‘insured about 29,500 single-
employer defined benefit plans, down from an all-time high of 112,000 plans in 1985. This 
decline primarily reflects a large number of terminations among small plans’ (PBGC 2003: 11). 
8 Furthermore, American conservatives propagated ‘demographic pessimism.’ More specifically, 
they exploited growing fears about the negative fiscal consequences of demographic aging to 
argue that only the advent of a fully funded program would ‘save Social Security.’ (e.g. Baker 
and Weisbrot 1999)   28
                                                                                                                                                              
9 Yet, one must note that support for Social Security privatization within the financial industry is 
far from being unanimous (Darby and Celarier 1999).  
10 A recent Gallup Survey shows that, besides HMOs, big business is the least trusted institution 
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